Optimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will? A Gramscian Analysis of Two New York Police Reform Campaigns by Covington, Christian
City University of New York (CUNY) 
CUNY Academic Works 
Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects CUNY Graduate Center 
6-2021 
Optimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will? A Gramscian 
Analysis of Two New York Police Reform Campaigns 
Christian Covington 
The Graduate Center, City University of New York 
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know! 
More information about this work at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu/gc_etds/4356 
Discover additional works at: https://academicworks.cuny.edu 
This work is made publicly available by the City University of New York (CUNY). 
Contact: AcademicWorks@cuny.edu 
OPTIMISM OF THE INTELLECT, PESSIMISM OF THE WILL? 







A master’s thesis submitted to the Graduate Faculty in Political Science in partial fulfillment of 























































All Rights Reserved 
  
 iii 
Optimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will? 





Name of Student (Print) 
 
This manuscript has been read and accepted for the Graduate Faculty in Political 




    Benedetto Fontana 
    Thesis Advisor (Print) 
 
 
    
 
 
    
Date    Thesis Advisor (Signature) 
 
 
    Alyson Cole 



























Optimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will? 




Advisor: Benedetto Fontana 
This paper attempts to analyze two recent New York police reform campaigns - one to 
overturn the state’s system of criminal bail release, the other to make police officer discipline 
transparent to the public - using theories given by Antonio Gramsci. The paper will apply the 
concepts of hegemony, hegemonic discourse, the intertwining of the state and civil society, the 
attainment of political agency amongst the subaltern, and the role ideology plays in all of these 
concepts, to assess the success of the reform campaigns. The paper will argue that many of 
these concepts are further developments of political theories first expounded by Machiavelli, in 
order to support the notion that Gramscian theory is not strictly Marxist, but a distinctly 
humanist approach to politics. 
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 Earlier this year, the Vera Institute of Justice, a criminal justice think tank located in New 
York City, quietly issued a report on the effect of changes made by the New York State 
Legislature in 2019 to the state’s system of criminal bail release. “Bail” refers to the legal rules 
establishing and regulating the conditions by which a person, after being arrested, is allowed to 
post a sum of money, either in cash or some form of security (“cash bail”), so as to be released 
from jail, pending either the completion of the criminal trial, or the final removal of the charges 
against the person.1 
 The legislature, and others working to enact these changes into law, gave several 
arguments in promoting this “bail reform,” but the initial ones were that: bail was a form of 
economic discrimination, in that those who could afford bail were allowed to be released, while 
those who could not languished in jail, although both persons may have been charged with the 
same criminal offense;2 bail was a form of racial discrimination, because Blacks and Latinos 
were overly represented in the group of persons who could not afford bail;3 and bail reversed 
the principle of the presumption of innocence before trial, in that persons unable to post cash 
 
1 New York Consolidated Laws Service (LexisNexis) N.Y. Criminal Procedure Law Articles 500 – 540 Procedures for 
Securing Attendance at Criminal Actions and Proceedings of Defendants and Witnesses Under Control of Court – 
Recognizance, Bail and Commitment (1971) 
2 Emma Whitford, “Momentum Builds For Ending Cash Bail System That Punishes The Poor,” Gothamist, August 10, 
2017 https://gothamist.com/news/momentum-builds-for-ending-cash-bail-system-that-punishes-the-poor; Errol 
Louis, “A bold move against bad bail,” Daily News (New York), October 9, 2018; John Raphling and DeAnna Hoskins, 
“The right kind of bail reform,” Daily News (New York), March 4, 2019 https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-
oped-the-right-kind-of-bail-reform-20190301-story.html  
3 Nick Pinto, “The Unraveling of Hard-Won Criminal Justice Reforms in New York,” The Intercept, February 23, 2020 
https://theintercept.com/2020/02/23/criminal-justice-bail-reform-backlash-new-york/ 
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bail endured lengthy jail stays before trial, and in fact, were more likely than persons who could 
afford bail to plead guilty to the criminal charges, in some instances, just to get out of jail.4 
 Consequently, the legislature, in the 2019 session, voted to make it impossible to 
require that a person have to post cash bail in order to be released from jail after being 
arrested for a criminal offense, excluding arrests for violent criminal offenses (e.g., assault) and 
some other offenses.5 Although the bail reform campaign had sought a complete ban on the 
use of cash bail, a compromise was made to exclude violent offenses from the bill in order to 
secure passage of the legislation.6 Nevertheless, a study published by John Jay College of 
Criminal Justice noted that the new law would apply to 91% of the persons arrested in New 
York.7 
 Thus, it was perhaps discouraging to bail reform proponents when the Vera Institute 
report issued this past February noted that: the racial disparity between Black and whites as to 
arrestees being held in jail had actually increased since the bail law took effect on January 1, 
 
4 Justine Olderman, Lisa Schreibersdorf, Tina Luongo, Stan German and Matt Knecht, “Real Criminal Justice Reform 
Requires Standing Up to Fear-Mongering,” Gotham Gazette, January 1, 2020 https://www.gothamgazette.com 
/opinion/9025-real-criminal-justice-reform-stand-up-fear-mongering; Michael Blake and Elizabeth Gaynes, “The 
Social Value of Bail Reform,” Gotham Gazette, January 17, 2020 https://www.gothamgazette.com/opinion/9058-
the-social-value-of-bail-reform-more-to-do-criminal-justice 
5 Michael Rempel and Krystal Rodriguez, Bail Reform in New York: Legislative Provisions and Implications for New 
York City, Center for Court Innovation (April 2019) 
https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY_full_0.pdf 
6 Jeff Coltinis, “Cash bail still in judges’ tool belts after major reforms,” City & State, April 1, 2019 
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/policy/new-york-bail-reform-changes.html 
7 Richard Khavkine, “Hate Crimes and Other Occurrences Trigger Pushback on Bail Reforms,” Chief-Leader, January 
3, 2020. The percentage stated applied to persons whose criminal case extended beyond the initial court 
appearance, the criminal arraignment; that is, it applied to persons for whom if bail were required, would have to 
be incarcerated in jail, if they could not post bail. 
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2020; people held in jail were staying longer than before; and the total number of persons held 
in jail prior to trial had hardly declined in New York State since the passage of bail reform.8 
 In June of 2020, the New York State Legislature voted to repeal Section 50-a of the 
state’s Civil Rights Law, the section that prohibited police departments from releasing details 
about a police officer’s disciplinary record to the public.9 Nevertheless, when the New York 
Police Department (NYPD) finally released the information which it deemed as complying with 
the state’s mandate, the release was met with something less than universal acclaim: “[this] is a 
slap in the face to every New Yorker that took to the streets and the polls demanding an end to 
the secrecy shrouding NYPD abuse,” noted one commentator;10 "this isn't transparency, it's a 
PR tool for the NYPD,” noted another.11 
 These criticisms stemmed from the NYPD’s narrow interpretation of the legislature’s 
repeal and of a Federal court’s decision confirming the repeal of Section 50-a. Whereas the 
court’s decision allowed the NYPD to release all disciplinary decisions regarding an officer, the 
department chose to release only those records that resulted in a finding of an admission of 
guilt.12 As a para-military organization, however, discipline in the NYPD can be imposed by a 
superior officer without a finding of guilt.13 Additionally, there are many discipline hearings that 
 
8 Kay Dervishi, “Bail reform reduced jail populations, but racial disparities worsened,” City & State, February 18, 
2021 https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/policy/criminal-justice/bail-reform-reduced-jail-populations-racial-
disparities-worsened; Vera Institute of Justice, “Empire State of Incarceration,” February 18, 2021 
https://www.vera.org/empire-state-of-incarceration-2021 (accessed April 6, 2021) 
9 Denis Slattery, “Shining a new light on NYPD,” Daily News (New York) June 10, 2020 
10 Ashley Southall, “NYPD Releases Secret Misconduct Records After Repeal of Shield Law,” New York Times, March 
8, 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/03/08/nyregion/nypd-discipline-records.html 
11 Jake Offenhartz, “New NYPD Database Offers “Narrow” Glimpse at Police Discipline Records,” Gothamist, March 
9, 2021 https://gothamist.com/news/new-nypd-database-offers-narrow-glimpse-police-disciplinary-records 
12 Southall, “NYPD Releases”; Uniformed Fire Officers Ass'n v. De Blasio, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 4266 (accessed 
February 17, 2021 10:50 AM) 
13 See, e.g., N.Y.P.D. Patrol Guide Section 206-02 “Schedule “A” and Schedule “B” Command Discipline” (which 
empowers a superior to discipline officers without resorting to formal charges); N.Y.P.D. Patrol Guide Section 206-
 4 
result in an officer accepting punishment without a finding of guilt (with the exact number of 
such cases, of course, being unknown).14 Thus, the department’s decision to disclose only those 
cases that resulted in a finding of admission of guilt served to exclude the vast majority of its 
discipline cases. Moreover, the department’s data release also excluded: all pending discipline 
cases; all discipline cases finalized before 2014; all discipline cases in which an officer was not 
punished; and all discipline cases in which the officer accepted a lesser degree of punishment.15 
It was clear that the department’s attempt at discipline transparency still left many matters in 
the dark. 
Both the legislature’s repeal of Section 50-a and its enactment of the bail reform were 
the culmination of years-long campaigns (“reform campaigns”) conducted by coalitions of non-
governmental organizations seeking to make changes to New York’s criminal justice system. 
And while it would be charitable to say that these reform campaigns were partially successful, 
in my opinion, such a statement would not be honest or accurate. One campaign sought to 
eliminate the use of cash bail; it did not. The other campaign sought to make all of police officer 
disciplinary records transparent to the public; it did not. This paper is an attempt at an 
explanation as to why these campaigns were not successful. 
Before I embark on my explanation, however, I need to clarify the parameters of my 
discussion. I have chosen to term my paper as an analysis of police reform campaigns although 
cash bail is not exclusively a matter for the police, involving court officials, district attorneys and 
 
07 “Cause for Suspension or Modified Assignment” (which permits suspension of an officer when a superior officer 
considers such action necessary) 
14 See, e.g., Graham Rayman, “NYPD detective docked vacation days in informant fiasco,” Daily News (New York), 
February 11, 2021 https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/ny-detective-disciplined-coerced-
informant-staten-island-20210212-cohjlgdzejerdixj6bkipgisny-story.html 
15 Southall, “NYPD Releases” 
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defense attorneys. Nevertheless, the primary arguments made against bail reform were made 
from a police perspective, revolving around issues of increased crime, the release of arrested 
persons making police officers’ jobs more difficult and bail reform in general signifying a 
decreased lack of respect for law enforcement.16 Although district attorneys also argued against 
bail reform,17 the issue in the general public’s mind remained one of crime and policing.18 
Additionally, in analyzing the reform campaign for the repeal of Section 50-a, I have 
restricted my discussion to the debate surrounding New York City and the NYPD. While Section 
50-a was a state measure that applied to all of New York State’s police departments, I have 
chosen to focus on the debate that targeted the NYPD for three reasons: the NYPD has the 
largest police force in the state, by far, with the total number of officers for New York City being 
more than all of the police officers in the rest of the state;19 the reform campaigns directed 
most of their efforts to New York City and Section 50-a repeal was very much perceived as a 
 
16 Editorial, “Justice and Safety for All,” Daily News (New York), March 28, 2019; Craig McCarthy, “NYPD Big Rips 
Bail-Reform 'Free'-for-All,” New York Post, August 12, 2019; Rebecca Rosenberg, Carl Campanile and Tina Moore, 
“NY, Get Ready for the Bad Ol' 'Daze',” New York Post, January 1, 2020 https://nypost.com/2019/12/31/why-new-
york-criminals-are-celebrating-the-new-year/ 
17 Eric Gonzalez, Darcel Clark, Cyrus Vance, Anthony Scarpino, Madeline Singas and Timothy Sini, “Reforms Fraught 
with Serious Risk,” Daily News (New York), March 27, 2019 https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-oped-
reforms-fraught-with-serious-risk-20190327-nmezjrqncnatlgnopev4wuoc2q-story.html; John Ryan, “Bail Out of 
This Botched Reform,” Daily News (New York), June 17, 2019 
18 Ashley Southall and Jesse McKinley, “Spike in Crime Inflames Debate Over Bail Law in New York,” New York 
Times, February 4, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/04/nyregion/crime-stats-nyc-bail-reform.html; 
Associated Press, “Siena Poll: Declining Support for New York’s Bail Changes,” January 21, 2020 
https://apnews.com/article/b7b920b62e3660ef0a602aefa427ef64 
19 Brian A. Reaves, Census of State and Local Law Enforcement Agencies 2008, July 2011 
 https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/csllea08.pdf (New York City 36,023; remainder of New York State 30,449)  
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local issue;20 and the NYPD was the party in the repeal debate that was most successful in 
steering the Section 50-a legislation to its favor.21  
The NYPD’s success was a political one, and I intend to show how the political contest 
was engaged in between the reform campaign and its opponents, what constituted the field of 
contest, how the contest was fought and what factors contributed to victory and defeat. Many 
reasons can be given for the campaigns lack of success, but the primary reason, in my opinion, 
is they lacked an accurate conception of themselves and of the mass of people for whom they 
claimed to be speaking, and of how both related to political power, with this misconception 
creating an inaccurate assessment of their opponents and of how power is constituted.  
I have adopted a Gramscian analytic, rooted in Machiavellian political theory, to engage 
with the subject matter. Gramsci’s thought is an appropriate basis for analyzing these 
campaigns because his thinking is based in historicism, that is, in an assessment of human 
activity becoming conscious of itself, and of the manner in which the organized will of humans’ 
structures knowledge. Specifically, I am asserting five reasons why the campaigns were not 
successful, all stemming from their initial misconception. First, they never understood their task 
as obtaining power for the mass of citizens who lacked it in regard to the police. Second, this 
lack of understanding led to a failure to develop the mass of people who could develop this 
 
20 Kenneth Lovett, “Fighting NYPD Shield: Kin of 16 Slain by Cops Want Open-Records Law,” Daily News (New York), 
December 24, 2018 https://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/ny-pol-50a-police-discipline-diallo-bell-garner-
carr-20181223-story.html; Richard Khavkine, “At CCRB Meeting, Calls for Repeal of Law Shielding Cops' Records,” 
Chief-Leader, November 15, 2019 https://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/at-ccrb-meeting-calls-for-
repeal-of-law-shielding-cops-records/article_dc31790e-07bd-11ea-aa6b-87bcf2d45755.html; Richard Khavkine, 
“Williams Among Those Out for Repeal of Law Shielding Cop Records,” Chief-Leader, March 25, 2019 
https://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/williams-among-those-out-for-repeal-of-law-shielding-cop-
records/article_fcd59886-4cb8-11e9-8944-f759ab64c640.html 
21 New York State Senate Public Hearing: Policing (S3695), repeals provisions relating to personnel records of police 
officers, firefighters, and correctional officers https://www.nysenate.gov/calendar/public-hearings/october-24-
2019/public-hearing-policing-s3695-repeals-provisions-relating (accessed April 21, 2021 6:29 PM) 
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new relationship to the police. Third, this failure was mainly due to the leaders of the 
campaigns not engaging in a dialectical relationship with the people for whom they claimed to 
be speaking. This lack of engagement led to the fourth reason, that the reform campaigns never 
created an adequate ideological basis for their arguments. Fifth, the campaigns inaccurately 
assessed the state as being the legislature, without accommodating the role of police 
departments, district attorneys in dominating civil society discourse and thus, dominating the 
discourse around their two campaigns. Finally, I conclude that all these failures, instead of 
advancing the cause of police reform, only served to hinder it even more. 
  
 8 
II. Two Police Reform Campaigns  
 
 In the fall of 2010, The Atlantic Philanthropies and the Open Society Foundations 
convened a number of non-governmental organizations engaged in promoting fair and just 
policing in New York City. Subsequent to this convening, a planning committee of nine 
organizations convened three additional meetings in the summer of 2011 to eventually form 
Communities United for 
Police Reform (“CPR”).22 Over the next several years, CPR engaged in several police reform 
campaigns, mainly directed at urging the New York City Council to adopt legislation enhancing 
the accountability of officers of the NYPD.23 CPR currently is made up of 31 core members who 
participate actively in the work of the coalition.24 
 In the fall of 2011, the New York Civil Liberties Union (“NYCLU”) filed a lawsuit to compel 
the NYPD to release redacted records of final opinions issued since 2001 of police officer 
disciplinary cases investigated by the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board.25 A 
lawsuit was deemed necessary to compel production of these records because under Section 
 
22 Tides Foundation/The Advocacy Fund, Funds for Fair and Just Policing: Request for Letters of Inquiry December 
2011 
23 “Community Safety Act”  campaign (creating an Inspector General’s office for the NYPD, amongst other 
measures, took effect January 2014) https://www.changethenypd.org/community-safety-act (accessed April 22, 
2021 2:15 PM); “Right to Know Act” campaign (requiring NYPD officers to identify themselves, amongst other 
measures, took effect October 2018) https://www.changethenypd.org/RightToKnowAct (accessed April 22, 2021 
2:12 PM) 
24 Communities United for Police Reform, “Members”  https://www.changethenypd.org/campaign/intro-members 
(accessed April 22, 2021 2:21 PM) 
25 Tom Robbins, “How a Coalition of New York Activists Revealed Police-Department Secrets,” The New Yorker, July 
17, 2020 https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-local-correspondents/how-a-coalition-of-new-york-activists-
revealed-police-department-secrets; NYCLU is also a member of CPR. The New York City Civilian Complaint Board 
investigates and adjudicates a subsection of discipline complaints made against police officers which involve officer 
interactions with members of the public. https://www1.nyc.gov/site/mckinley/about/about.page (accessed April 
22, 2021 2:43 PM) 
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50-a of New York State’s Civil Rights Law, discipline decisions were considered part of a police 
officer’s personnel record, and Section 50-a required that this record be kept confidential.26 
 The NYCLU lawsuit took several years to finally adjudicate, but while it was still wending 
its way through the court system, in late July 2014, NYPD officer Daniel Pantaleo, in an attempt 
to arrest Eric Garner, placed his arm around Garner’s neck in order to subdue him. Garner 
eventually collapsed and died, with the entire interaction being captured on video.27 When on 
December 2 of that year, a grand jury declined to indict officer Pantaleo for any criminal 
wrongdoing,28 protests broke out, lasting several weeks, with protesters seeking to disrupt 
traffic along New York’s bridges, tunnels, roadways and train terminals.29 
 The relevance of Garner’s death to the issue of Section 50-a and police discipline was 
not immediate; however, almost two years after Garner’s death, in April 2016, published 
accounts noted that officer Pantaleo had been investigated for a disciplinary infraction more 
than two years before Garner’s death, with the final decision coming three years later, and with 
the fact of this decision just then being released to the public.30 For years, the NYPD had 
 
26 Richard Khavkine, “NYPD Wins in Court on Cop Discipline Records,” Chief-Leader, December 17, 2018 
https://thechiefleader.com/news/news_of_the_week/nypd-wins-in-court-on-cop-discipline-records 
/article_92851562-ffd1-11e8-ba69-1f3a0e02ee43.html; New York State Assembly Bill No. A02513 
(https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?default_fld=&leg_video=&bn=A02513&term=2019 &Summary=Y&Actions=Y) 
27 Editorial, “A death to investigate,” Daily News (New York), July 19, 2014 
28 J. David Goodman and Al Baker, “Wave of Protests After Grand Jury Doesn’t Indict Officer in Eric Garner 
Chokehold Case,” New York Times, December 3, 2014 https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/04/nyregion/grand-
jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric-garner.html 
29 Jason Molinet, “Eric Garner grand jury decision sparks protests which shut down West Side Highway, Brooklyn 
Bridge and Lincoln Tunnel,” Daily News (New York), December 3, 2014 https://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/protests-grand-jury-fails-indict-nypd-article-1.2032546; J. David Goodman, “Amid Assaults on Officers, New 
York Police Rethink Their Response to Protests,” New York Times, December 14, 2014 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/15/nyregion/police-arrest-man-on-assault-charge-during-protest-on-
brooklyn-bridge.html 
30 Ryan Sit, “Cop Suspected in Eric Garner's Death Disciplined by NYPD,” Daily News (New York), April 4, 2016 
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released limited information regarding disciplinary decisions to the media.31 But the dilatory 
release of the limited discipline information regarding officer Pantaleo seemed to suggest a 
departmental attempt to hide news about an unpopular subject. This attempt, along with the 
anger over Garner’s death, and the fact that the discipline case over Garner’s death had not yet 
occurred,32 all became of one-piece, conflating into a general unhappiness with the state of 
NYPD discipline and its lack of transparency. 
 This general unhappiness was compounded when, in response to a lawsuit filed to 
obtain additional information regarding officer Pantaleo’s discipline record, the NYPD stopped 
releasing even the limited amount of discipline information it had customarily released since 
the passage of Section 50-a into law in the 1970’s.33 Soon, judges, lawyers groups and editorial 
boards were joining the criminal justice activists and attorneys in clamoring for greater 
transparency as to NYPD discipline decisions.34 When, however, in December 2018, the 
appellate court denied the NYCLU’s lawsuit seeking even redacted NYPD discipline records, it 
seemed as if no change was imminent.35 
 
31 Rocco Parascandola and Graham Rayman, “NYPD won't share actions against disciplined cops,” Daily News (New 
York), August 24, 2016 
32 In fact, the discipline case would not be heard until 2019. Ashley Southall, “‘I Can’t Breathe’: 5 Years After Eric 
Garner’s Death, an Officer Faces Trial,” New York Times, May 12, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12 
/nyregion/eric-garner-death-daniel-pantaleo-chokehold.html; Ashley Southall, Ali Watkins and William K. 
Rashbaum, “Daniel Pantaleo, N.Y.P.D. Officer in Eric Garner’s Death, Should Be Fired, Judge Says,” New York Times, 
August 2, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/nyregion/eric-garner-daniel-pantaleo.html 
33 Rick Rojas, “New York Police Dept., Citing Law, Stops Sharing Personnel Data,” New York Times, August 24, 2016 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/nyregion/new-york-police-dept-citing-law-stops-sharing-personnel-
data.html?ref=todayspaper 
34 Ashley Southall, “4 Years After Eric Garner’s Death, Secrecy Law on Police Discipline Remains Unchanged,” New 
York Times, June 3, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/03/nyregion/police-discipline-records-garner.html; 
Editorial, “NYPD in view,” Daily News (New York), December 17, 2018; Mark Toor, “PBA Criticizes Call for Repeal of 
Secrecy Law,” Chief-Leader, May 7, 2018 https://nycpba.org/news-items/chief/2018/pba-criticizes-call-for-repeal-
of-secrecy-law/ 
35 Graham Rayman, “Can’t air cops’ records: court,” Daily News (New York), December 12, 2018 
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 Nevertheless, the steady drumbeat of criticism prompted both Mayor Bill DeBlasio and 
then-Commissioner James O’Neal to respond in some fashion.36 In June 2018, O’Neal appointed 
a panel to assess the NYPD’s system of discipline, including its lack of transparency.37 In early 
February 2019, O’Neal responded to the panel’s report by basically stating the department’s 
position on discipline transparency would revert to the status quo ante: “We need to put out 
names, charges, documents and outcomes,” he declared.38 
 O’Neal’s declaration came less than two weeks after a bill had been filed in the New 
York State Assembly completely repealing Section 50-a,39 and six months after CPR had made 
its first appeal for the repeal of Section 50-a.40 CPR had previously worked on the “Community 
Safety Act” and the “Right to Know Act;” it would term its work on the repeal of Section 50-a, 
the “Safer NY Act.” Coincidentally, the day preceding the filing of the Section 50-a bill, a bill to 
eliminate cash bail was filed in the New York State Senate.41 
 This was not the first bill to have been filed to eliminate cash bill, with bills having been 
filed the previous two sessions. Both bills were accompanied by declarations from New York 
 
36 Jillian Jorgensen, “No record of de Blasio’s cop disciplinary talks: Gov. Cuomo aide,” Daily News (New York), 
March 17, 2018; Editorial, “The light blue wall of silence: The NYPD gets semi-transparent,” Daily News (New York), 
March 30, 2018 https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/light-blue-wall-silence-nypd-semi-transparent-article-
1.3904360 
37 Rocco Parascandola, “3 ex-fed bigs on panel to review NYPD discipline,” Daily News (New York), June 22, 2018 
38 Ali Watkins and Ali Watson, “After Critical Report, Police Commissioner Pushes for More Sunlight on Disciplinary 
Files,” New York Times, February 2, 2019 
39 New York State Assembly Bill No. A02513  
40 Communities United for Police Reform, “Press Release,”  https://www.changethenypd.org/releases/state-
legislators-advocates-call-repeal-new-york%E2%80%99s-police-secrecy-law-among-worst-nation (accessed April 
22, 2021 5:11 PM) 
41 New York State Senate Bill No. S2101A (https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2019/s2101) 
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Governor Andrew Cuomo that criminal justice reform was needed, such declarations perhaps 
being significant only for their lack of success.42  
Nevertheless, there was an air of expectation about the latest filing: the most recent 
state Senate elections had returned a Democratic majority for only the third time in the last 50 
years,43 and along with the Democratic Governor Cuomo and a Democratic Assembly (which 
had long had a Democratic majority), it was expected that progressive legislation, including 
criminal justice reform, could be enacted into law with the help of this “Blue Wave.”44 
Adding to this air of expectation was the appearance of a criminal justice reform group 
that had made the elimination of bail its primary mission. New Yorkers United for Justice 
(“NYUJ”) was a well-funded (supported by several billionaires)45 coalition of thirteen national 
and New York City-based organizations that proposed a new approach to bail reform: “If you 
talk about [elimination of cash bail] like it’s a social-justice issue, [people won’t understand],” 
noted one member of the coalition. "But if you talk about it… like this is going to save money. ... 
I think that they'll start to sort of understand where you're coming from."46 NYUJ was not a 
member driven organization; rather it was formed with the specific intent of providing a 
 
42 Erin Durkin, “Reform this now! Gov pushes overhaul of the justice system,” Daily News (New York), January 16, 
2017; Shayna Jacobs and Reuven Blau, “Bail goes bye: Cy,” Daily News (New York), January 10, 2018 
43 Rebecca C. Lewis, “The Blue Wave that Swamped the State Senate Republicans,” City & State, November 7, 2018 
https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/politics/campaigns-elections/democrats-won-majority-in-new-york-
state-senate.html 
44 Kenneth Lovett, “Do your Dem job,” Daily News (New York), November 14, 2018 
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platform to unite the political left and right by lobbying legislators and conducting media buys 
to educate the public and elected officials on the value of bail reform.47 
Although other criminal justice advocates and lawyers’ groups advocated for bail 
reform,48 NYUJ dominated the arguments for the elimination of cash bail. To the stance that 
bail reform was an issue of racial, economic and procedural justice, NYUJ added the argument 
that the requirement for cash bail was a waste of money. For instance, they argued: 
• Most persons required to post bail stay in jail for only two days,49 but even a two 
day stay is likely to cost a person their job, access to public housing, student 
loans, or childcare, etc.50 
• The cost of jailing a person before trial is almost $1,000 per day,51 while only 4% 
of persons not jailed before trial fail to appear in court before their trial 
These economic arguments tied into the other arguments for bail reform, for instance 
that: 
• Requiring cash bail was a criminalization of poverty, because wealthier persons 
could raise bail for similar offenses while an indigent person could not52 
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• Requiring cash bail is racially discriminatory, as the requirement mainly effected 
Black and Latino persons who have been arrested53 
• Requiring cash bail reversed the presumption of a person’s innocence before 
trial and operated as a form of pre-trial punishment54 
• And this form of pre-trial punishment led to innocent people being jailed for 
years because they were unable to post a cash bond55 or to people pleading 
guilty to criminal charges as the only means to get out of jail56 
 
These arguments were countered by those of New York state’s police departments, 
police unions and district attorneys.57 Their arguments centered wholly upon the fear of crime 
and the use of bail as a deterrence to criminal activity. This counter-argument did not engage, 
with the economic issue of the cost of cash bail to government or to society, except to argue 
that cash bail was not a penalty for being poor, but rather was a penalty for criminal activity.58 
Some of the arguments given by police and district attorneys were that: 
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• Not jailing defendants before trial would be dangerous to the public59 and that 
persons released before trial would commit other crimes while awaiting trial,60 
with officials providing examples of heinous crimes committed, that they linked 
to bail reform, regardless of the inaccuracy of this linkage61 
• More crime would be committed without the threat of being jailed for an 
offense, i.e., unless bail were used to jail a person before trial62 and that to argue 
otherwise was to discount the superior knowledge police officials and district 
attorneys had of the criminal justice system63 
Thus, proponents and opponents of bail reform engaged in arguments that mostly did 
not engage the other side’s argument. Both sides did, however, use similar strategies to win 
their argument: lobbying legislators, press conferences and utilizing both paid and unpaid 
media (editorials and op-eds). Although proponents of bail reform were able to place op-eds 
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consistently in New York’s print media, the editorial boards were almost uniformly opposed to 
eliminating cash bail.64 
Consequently, even though bail reform was eventually enacted into law in April 2019, it 
was not the full elimination that the reform campaigns sought, but a compromise version which 
excluded from the restriction on imposing cash bail any criminal offense involving violence, as 
well as some other non-violent offenses.65 And what was perhaps worse than the compromise, 
police officials, unions, district attorneys and editorial boards continued to rail against the 
recently enacted bail law, so much so, that the legislature began to consider “reform to the 
reform” even before the new law took effect on January 1, 2020.66 
Thus, while reform campaign advocates for the repeal of Section 50-a argued that the 
bail legislation provided momentum for their own cause,67 a state legislator quietly mentioned 
that repeal would be impossible in the current anti-police reform political climate.68 This lack of 
initiative was confirmed in October 2019 by the state Senator who controlled the passage of 
any repeal of Section 50-a, who flatly declared that repeal would not happen in the next 
legislative session (2020) and might not happen for several years.69 
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The Senator’s statement came days before an NYPD official testified before the 
Senator’s committee, urging not a repeal of Section 50-a, but a “reform” along the lines 
outlined earlier in the year by Commissioner O’Neal – making public some police officer 
disciplinary information (name of officer, charges accused of, penalty assessed) only in regard 
to serious instances of misconduct and only after a final disciplinary outcome had been 
reached.70  
As the legislative session opened in January, published reports noted that a New York 
City program, created to ensure persons released before trial would appear for their scheduled 
court appearance, was months away from being ready. Therefore, the 2020 state legislative 
session began with a lack of initiative in terms of repeal of Section 50-a and the bail law and 
with an attempt to roll back the reform achieved in the previous session.  
NYUJ tried to restore the momentum for reform with a $2 million media buy for a public 
education campaign.71 But the attempted roll back became manifest when, in late February, 
Governor Cuomo announced he would not approve a state budget unless new restrictions were 
added to the bail law.72 When the “reform to the reform” bill did pass the legislature (adding 
more non-violent offenses to the list of those requiring bail),73 it was generally conceded that 
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all hope for any major criminal justice reform in 2020 was lost,74 despite the fact that a bill 
seeking to repeal Section 50-a had been filed in the state Senate.75 
All of this changed when George Floyd was choked to death by a Minneapolis police 
officer on May 25.76 Protests of the death began in New York City the following day,77 and four 
days later Governor Cuomo announced his newfound support for repealing Section 50-a.78 
After looting started in the city and a curfew was imposed,79 the Governor reiterated his 
support: “We are also outraged [about the death of George Floyd] and we are going to do 
something about it, and if 50-a is all we can do as a state, we’re going to do 50-a.”80 
Thus, it was that what had taken almost ten years of activity, what had seemed hopeless 
only a few months before, came to be: the repeal of Section 50-a. A new version of the repeal 
bill was filed on June 6,81 and within a week the bill had passed both houses82 and been signed 
by the Governor,83 completely smashing expectations as to what was and what was not 
possible in the state legislature. 
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Nevertheless, the sudden rush to victory had caught the reform campaign for repeal of 
Section 50-a on the hop; they had not engaged in the legislative detail of the repeal bill and in 
fact, in the heady days after passage of the bill, proceeded on a victory lap.84 But the language 
of the bill was not so clear-cut; while Section 50-a was indeed repealed, the bill had installed a 
new system by which disciplinary records were to be revealed to the public and the intent of 
this new system was neither obvious nor clear.  
Almost immediately after the bill’s passage, New York City’s police unions filed suit to 
stop the release of any discipline information, and a state court barred the release of any 
information that had not been the subject of a final disciplinary hearing.85 Soon thereafter, the 
NYPD announced it would not release any police officer discipline information to the public, 
pending a final decision on the repeal of Section 50-a by a Federal appeals court.86 This 
dilemma could have been foreseen by the manner in which the debate on the repeal of Section 
50-a was conducted. When the reform campaign argued for transparency, the NYPD consented 
to this argument, but wanted to set the terms of what transparency meant. 
Once again, as with the bail reform campaign, the different sides of the debate mostly 
talked past each other. The reform campaign argued that: 
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• Transparent discipline was needed to ensure a fair discipline system87 and would 
increase the public’s confidence in the NYPD88 and increase trust in individual 
officers89 
• The public had a right to know how government officials performed their tasks, 
especially with regard to police officers,90 and especially for persons who had 
been subject to officer misconduct but were unable to discover whether the 
officer had been disciplined91 
 
The NYPD and its unions, on the other hand, argued that discipline transparency would 
lead to harm against individual officers92 and would destroy the public’s confidence in the 
police.93 The NYPD agreed with the reform campaign that transparency could lead to an 
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increase in trust in individual officers,94 but only if this transparency was on its own terms: 
discipline should be made transparent to the public only in cases of serious misconduct.95 
Both the reform campaigns proponents and opponents relied on the same tactics to 
achieve their results: lobbying state legislators, holding press conferences and utilizing paid and 
unpaid media. CPR, as a member-driven organization, also organized rallies of their coalition 
members, usually at the steps of the legislature. The city’s print media was overwhelmingly in 
favor of repealing Section 50-a, but was willing to concede that the terms of the replacement 
needed to be worked out by the NYPD,96 which was exactly what the department did. 
The language of the bill repealing Section 50-a tracked exactly what the NYPD testified 
to in the October 2019 state Senate hearing. The new law allowed police discipline 
transparency only in cases of serious instances of misconduct and only after a final disciplinary 
outcome had been reached.97 And while the reform campaigns cried foul,98 that “repeal meant 
repeal,” it was clear that the new law was not the blanket removal of all restrictions on 
releasing officer discipline information that they had desired. 
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Thus, when the Federal appeals court rendered its decision on the Section 50-a repeal 
bill this February, it confirmed that the bill applied only to serious misconduct and that the bill 
allowed the NYPD to release information not subject to a final disciplinary outcome (that is, the 
NYPD was permitted to release results of discipline investigations or records of discipline that 
had been handed down outside of an NYPD internal hearing).99 Consequently, the NYPD, 
consistent with its intention all along, chose not to take advantage of the latitude granted by 
the court, and released only that discipline information that had been subject to a final 
determination.100 
Such a conclusion to the repeal of Section 50-a campaign should have been anticipated. 
As with the bail reform campaign, reform proponents failed to engage in political tactics 
suitable to achieve their strategic goals. I maintain these failures on a tactical level were due to 
the inadequate political epistemology of the reform campaigns. It now becomes incumbent for 
me to explain what I think an adequate epistemology looks like and why I think it would have 
made a difference to the success of these campaigns. 
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III. Gramsci’s Machiavellian Roots 
 
To understand the roots of Gramsci’s political involvement one needs to know that his 
involvement starts from an attempt to resolve Italy’s “Southern Question.”101 He was most 
concerned of how to address the political marginalization and economic and cultural 
backwardness of the Southern half of Italy, and in particular, the peasantry of Southern Italy.102 
Gramsci noted that the process of risorgimento, or the creation of the modern Italian national 
state, had not involved incorporating the Southern peasantry into the political process.103 
The risorgimento had in fact created not a state with a coherent national philosophy, but rather 
had merely extended the rule of the Piedmontese monarchy over the entire territory, thus 
maintaining the distinctly different regional political ethos of Italy. 
One element of this ethos was a dominant belief that the backwardness of Southern 
Italy stemmed from the innate characteristics of Southern Italians, in their lack of initiative and 
disinterest in participating in a modern economy.104 Gramsci rejected this notion, asserting that 
the Southern Question was one that was historically determined by specific economic and 
political causes.105 Gramsci’s response to the material condition of the Southern peasantry was  
a political one, that Italy needed to formulate a new national political ethos, one that included 
the southern peasantry. 
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As a socialist, Gramsci acknowledged the urban proletariat as the leading class for 
bringing about this new society, but insisted that this change could not happen without the 
proletariat establishing a class alliance with the Southern peasantry.106 This alliance, in turn, 
could not happen unless the proletariat understood the class demands of the peasantry. 107 
The Southern peasants, therefore, needed to be able to clearly articulate what were their 
demands. The peasants, however, were disaggregated and fragmented; they lacked a distinct 
set of economic or political demands108 
Gramsci asserted that this failure to establish distinct class based demands stemmed 
from the manner in which the peasantry understood their interests. Gramsci felt their 
understanding had been formed by the intellectual class of Southern Italy, a class which was 
beholden to the landowner class and which therefore transmitted a cultural and political 
outlook to the peasantry that favored the interests of the landowner.109 This inability of the 
peasantry to articulate their own interests diminished the possibility of their forming a class 
alliance with the proletariat. 
This epistemological approach to a political problem encompassed all of Gramsci’s 
political concerns regarding the Italian state: recognizing an historically determined political 
actor; ascertaining the factors contributing to the actor’s failure to assert themselves politically; 
 
106 Gramsci, The Southern Question, 20 
107 Gramsci, The Southern Question, 20 
108 Gramsci, The Southern Question, 35-39 
109 Gramsci, The Southern Question, 35-39 
 25 
the actor developing the mindset that allowed him to clarify what were his class interests; the 
actor using these class interests to establish cross-class alliances; and subsequently, using these 
cross-class alliances to create a new Italian national political ethos. 
It was this approach, and these questions, that Gramsci sought to resolve in the 
immediate post-war period in Italy. In this period, Gramsci was responding specifically to three 
events: the failure of the Turinese worker strikes and the dissolution of the workers’ councils 
that were supposed to initiate a proletariat revolution; the rise of fascism in Italy; and the 
change in Communist political doctrine that began to recognize that a proletarian revolution in 
Western Europe would not happen along the same lines as that in Russia.110 
Gramsci pursued a philosophical, historical and cultural response to this political 
problem. The socialist movement had been unable to overthrow bourgeois society while 
working within that society and utilizing its institutions.111 This was due to what Gramsci 
perceived as the movement being generally defensive in confronting capitalism, while offering 
declamatory and utopian appeals for mass action; the aftermath of defeat spurred him to 
reassess the bases for political action along the lines mentioned above.112 
The questions Gramsci raised about the political process, and the solutions at which he 
arrived, owed much to his study of the thought of Machiavelli. Machiavelli’s thought was 
rooted in a time of societal upheaval, similar to Gramsci’s: different types of rule (republican 
versus dynastic), economic bases (feudal landed interests versus urban elites) and political 
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structures (oligarchic versus popular) were all unsettled and in flux.113 Machiavelli sought to 
devise a more stable basis for a ruler’s political legitimacy, one that didn’t rely on the hereditary 
principle, and could survive when there was no basis for dynastic continuity.114 In the end, his 
search, as with Gramsci’s, led Machiavelli to develop a philosophical, historical and cultural 
response to a political problem. 
In developing this response, Machiavelli introduced two novel elements to the 
understanding of political power: the role of the “mass,” or the people, in securing legitimacy 
and the creation of a science of political statecraft, unmoored from any larger ethical or moral 
order.115 Machiavelli was the first thinker to note that the relationship between a ruler, who 
desires a more stable political order, and the “mass” has a dual nature, as both subject and 
object. The people serve as the subjects who support a ruler’s political legitimacy while at the 
same time serving as the object of the ruler’s efforts to create this new, more stable political 
order. 
Machiavelli recognized the dual nature of state power, that the force embodied in state 
power also had to incorporate the consent of the people in order to be truly effective. In such a 
dynamic, it was incumbent upon a ruler to create the subjects who would be responsive to the 
new order - a ruler needed to develop the understanding of the people so they would create 
the legitimacy needed to secure the new political order. 
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This idea supports Gramsci’s criticism of Italian political practice being based on a 
political elite that did not seek the approval of the mass of the people and did not rely on them 
for support. Gramsci felt, as Machiavelli did in his time, that the weakness of the Italian (or 
Florentine, for Machiavelli) state was due to this lack of popular support. Such weakness, he 
felt, was complicit in the state’s succumbing to fascism after World War I.116 
This was why Gramsci raised the specter of the Italian philosopher Benedetto Croce, 
who theorized that political knowledge had to distinguish between the ruler and the ruled. 
Gramsci viewed Croce as an “anti-Machiavellian” because Croce felt that political power had to 
be preserved within an elite in order to coerce and contain the nature of the mass of people, as 
opposed to relying on the mass of the people.117 
Nevertheless, Gramsci felt that Croce, in his attempt to exclude the masses from power, 
by trying to deny them a role in politics and history, revealed that the power of the masses 
could no longer be denied.118 Similarly, Gramsci viewed Croce’s call for an intellectual elite 
separate from the values and thought of the established power structure, an important 
development in how the political education of the masses could take place.119 This intellectual 
elite, according to Gramsci, could provide Italy with, not just new rulers, but a new type of 
political education for a new type of rule 
  But basing political rule on the mass of people raised two questions: how is this popular 
support generated and what does this support consist of? Machiavelli’s basing political 
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legitimacy on the support of the people introduced the mass of the people into history – the 
people were no longer objects of historical action, but had a role to play. This recognition of the 
people as historical actors required a ruler to uncover and make plain their reality, to show 
people the relevant facts of their existence, so they could understand their role as actors.120 
Once it was established what the facts of reality were, it was also possible to see how 
reality should be structured; by establishing a distinction between “what is,” or current reality, 
and “what ought to be,” an envisioned future, the ruler provides for the content of popular 
support.121 It is this transformative content that creates the basis for popular support. 
Additionally, this insertion of people into history alters their consciousness – history is 
not just something received, but is something created. Between the “what is” and “what ought 
to be,” or between the problem and the solution, lies a man who is an historical product, 
creating a solution which transcends the facts from which the problem arose.122 Thus, the 
people become part of the solution, not as followers of a leader, but as creators of a new 
reality. For Machiavelli, in order to create a new history, one had to locate oneself in relation to 
that history – one had to assimilate it, make it one’s own, in order to overcome it and create a 
new political order.123 
Gramsci noted that such a process “historicizes thought,” that this historicization reveals 
how certain conceptions of the world have created the world, and allows one to understand 
how these conceptions established the basis for concrete action in the world.124 Such a process 
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was important for two reasons: first, it shows “that reality does not exist on its own, in and for 
itself, but rather in a historical relationship with the men who modify it.” Second, this 
intellectual understanding of history has a political effect – this new conception of the world, 
generated by the new understanding of history, has meaning only when entered into reality; 
that is, the activity stemming from this new conception of the world, the placing of this new 
conception into material reality, is political activity.125 
Machiavelli’s idea that reality was something that man creates is crucial in 
understanding how he came to develop his second aspect of political power, that of political 
statecraft unmoored from any permanent ethical order. For Machiavelli, if man creates reality, 
political action takes place in a world without a permanent basis for action, without the 
“underlying norm of reality to which men could adjust or from which they could draw firm rules 
of conduct.”126  
Without this underlying norm of reality, the political actor always performs in a world in 
a state of flux, in which the only constant was movement and change.127 Just as important, a 
political actor needs to be able to distinguish between reality, illusion and effective reality, that 
is, between what is real, what is false, and what is the reality the actor wishes to create in order 
to reach the ends he desires.128 
Such an ability implies a certain form of knowledge that cannot be embodied in firm 
rules of conduct. Rather, Machiavelli sought to provide a set of precepts that could only be 
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assessed in relation to the specific circumstances the political actor encountered. Not simply a 
case of determining a problem and solution, Machiavelli offers a new political theory, one in 
which the problem and solution exist in a dynamic relationship with the actor who is creating 
the solution and the subject who is receiving it. The problem, solution, actor and subject are all 
interacting with each other to determine the adequacy of the response to the political issue129 
Machiavelli deemed this ability to develop an adequate response to a political issue as a 
skill, which he called virtu. Virtu necessitated the ability to assess the objective conditions of the 
political issue to be decided,130 while presupposing a recognition that the issue has to be dealt 
with in the political realm; that is, virtu requires that an actor perceive himself as an historical 
actor, one that has an ability to effect change131 
This ability to effect change, combined with the realization that an actor can effect 
change, Machiavelli terms fortuna, which, for Machiavelli, most appropriately exists in support 
of the creation of the new form of political legitimacy that relies on the mass of people. 
Thus, virtu is not simply a skill to be developed for political purposes, but has a content that 
seeks to guide fortuna so as to legitimate popular political control. Therefore, virtu, as defined 
by Machiavelli, carries with it the dual nature mirroring the relationship between the ruler and 
the “mass” – actions carried out according to virtu seek to create a new political and ethical 
order in which the “mass” begins to embody the new order which virtu encapsulates.132 
Similarly, actions carried out according to virtu promote recognition amongst the “mass” of its 
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ability to effect change; the nature of fortuna has changed from events that simply happen, to 
events that are shaped by the people acting for themselves133 
Thus, it becomes clear that what Machiavelli envisioned in a new political order is not 
simply an order in which a ruler develops willing subjects, but one in which the people are led 
to create the new political space in which a ruler operates. Consequently, the ruler is 
transformed into a representative of the people, and as such, legitimizes his rule with the 
people.134 Such a transformation, however, is only possible through the prior establishment of a 
structure of discourse that allows the people to respond to and converse with the ruler who is 
seeking to create this new order.135 
Machiavelli’s political theory served to ground Gramsci’s search for answers as to how 
to develop a new political ethos based on the mass, how to create historical and political 
agency, how to develop a relationship between the ruler and the mass, what was the political 
knowledge needed for this relationship, and the role of ideology to bring all these pieces 
together. All of these matters Gramsci sought to apply to the specific situation of a modern 
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IV. Gramsci’s Political Theory 
 
One can see how Machiavelli’s political project established the starting point for 
Gramsci’s search for solutions to the problems he perceived in reformulating the Italian political 
project. Through Machiavelli, Gramsci approached questions of historical and political agency; 
the creation of a new political ethos and how to develop the changed consciousness that 
completed this new ethos; the content of this new consciousness; the role of tactics and 
strategies in setting up this new ethos; the relations between a leader and the subjects of this 
new polity; and how to apply all of these aspects of the Machiavellian political epistemology to 
the specific circumstances of 1920’s Italy. 
And what I find fascinating in Gramsci’s approach is that it was rooted in his belief that 
the mass of people, the peasantry and the proletariat, that is, the subaltern, had to be part of 
developing an answer to these questions, not as subjects led to a solution, but as creators of 
any solution. This belief he incorporated into his political theory and his political practice; by 
assessing the faults of previous aspects of proletarian participation in Italian politics, Gramsci 
eventually redefined what was the essential political problem, that of the nature of power in 
Western societies.136 
Gramsci sought to restore the revolutionary initiative to the masses through the 
development of a conscious political agency based on a unified and coherent ideology. The 
immediate question for him was what would be the form of this agency? Gramsci was critical of 
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the failure of the socialists to engage the mass of workers on an intellectual level.137 Such 
criticism reflected the epistemological underpinnings of Gramsci’s philosophy, his concern with 
how a political knowledge could be formed that would develop the inherent agency of the 
workers.138 
Gramsci’s critical effort was first directed towards the restoration of the dialectic in 
political practice and the interplay between the objective economic and historical conditions in 
Italy and the specific subjective cultural, political and ideological conditions that the proletariat 
faced.139 The result of this effort was a bifurcation in Gramsci’s political project: an internally 
democratic mass party as the organic expression of the proletariat, along with a program of 
political education of the workers.140 
Adamson points out that the impact of the Russian Revolution was decisive for Gramsci 
in settling on this bifurcated apparatus; although the Turinese workers councils had been 
defeated in their attempt for power in 1920, Gramsci still insisted the Russian workers’ councils 
had demonstrated that an essentially economic institution could serve as the foundation for a 
reconstruction of the political process.141 Gramsci had noted how the Russian example had 
grasped the preparation, seizure of power and establishment of a new order as a single unified 
revolutionary process.142 To make such a process possible, Gramsci understood there needed to 
be a proletarian education in which “criticism might become culture;”143 it was the workers 
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changed consciousness, and the ability to critically assess their historical situation, brought 
about by the workers’ councils, that would ensure that the unified revolutionary process could 
take place. 
This focus on the dialectical nature of education raised another critical difference 
between Gramsci and previous proletarian education. He was critical of the ellipsis in Marxist 
political theory between the objective economic conditions for revolution and the subjective 
understanding the worker had of his historical and material situation; theory could not explain 
how the proletariat gained the personality necessary to bring about revolution.144  
Gramsci insisted that Marxist theory needed to be grounded in the reality the worker 
had to deal with, that the theoretician needed to translate his theory into the elements of 
historical life. By not adopting this dialectical approach, Marxist theory promoted a passive 
political approach, which led to a failure of the proletariat to gain political agency.145 “Thus, the 
general picture of human life which emerges in Gramsci's reappropriation of Marx is that of 
concrete individuals actively transforming the natural world in a collective process of social 
labor guided by shared practical and scientific interests.”146 Such a reappropriation allowed for 
a clear-eyed approach as to the complexities facing workers in a modern Western society such 
as Italy. 
Gramsci envisioned a lengthy program that would develop consciousness, one that was 
more suited to the intricate civil societies and superior state strength possessed by advanced 
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Western nations.147  In understanding the lack of success of the proletariat in Italy, Gramsci 
came to understand that the bourgeoise had developed superior elements of popular support 
and that the political struggle was more complex than the reductionist tendencies espoused by 
Marxist theoreticians.148 Political struggle was not a simple confrontation between antagonistic 
classes but the divining of a route amongst a complex relation of forces.149  
Thus, what Gramsci originally proposed as a simple political alliance between different 
sectors of the subaltern, between peasants and proletariat, expanded to encompass a complete 
fusion of economic, political, intellectual and moral objectives which, through the intermediary 
of ideology, would establish united economic and political objectives for the allied group.150 
This recognition of the role ideology played in developing consciousness, not just of the 
proletariat, but also of the bourgeoisie, led Gramsci to enlarge the notion of what constitutes 
the state. First, he posited the state as the site of coercion and domination, in which the 
violence necessary to maintain social order and stability are institutionalized through the states’ 
administrative, juridical and military apparatus. Second, he saw the state as the totality of the 
social, economic, political and cultural relations that form the ideological structure supporting 
the political and social order, a structure that he termed civil society.151  
This second notion of the state is a more positive vision than the first, and it was an 
important insight that Gramsci recognized civil society as not just where ideology was 
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produced, but as a site in which consent and direction were formulated.152 Ideas are developed 
in civil society in order to establish the terrain on which alternative ideas operate and on which 
movements opposed to the dominant political order can organize.153 “This image of a 
‘regulated society’… suggests both the absence of coercion [while simultaneously promoting] 
an active and productive public life.”154 The regulated society places limits on acceptable 
political discourse, while making these limits appear as a natural aspect of such discourse. 
Gramsci noted that the distinction between these two notions of the state were 
methodological, meaning that although the two were analytically distinct, they were 
intertwined in practice; any attempt to strategically realign the state would have to account for 
the fact that both notions support one another.155 Fontana offers a topographical description of 
Gramsci’s analysis of the state and civil society as a series of trench works, “together forming 
‘permanent fortifications’ which act as buttresses or supports for the state.”156 Thus, Gramsci’s 
enlargement of the state works on two levels: first, the social base of the state is enlarged 
though its complex of relations in civil society and second, the functions of the state are 
enlarged now that the functions of civil society are incorporated within the apparatus of the 
state.157 
Consequently, Gramsci’s enlarged notion of the state is not simply a site of power, nor 
simply a site in which ideology is generated, but one in which ideology is generated to serve 
power, in which the dual mechanism of state/civil society is utilized to create a worldview in the 
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service of the interests of power. And Adamson considers it one of Gramsci’s great insights that 
through his theory and practice, Gramsci was able to identify the process by which individuals 
come to constitute, and possibly, reconstitute this worldview.158 Most importantly, echoing 
Machiavelli, Gramsci recognized that adjusting a worldview relied on the political astuteness 
and cultural awareness of the individuals engaged in this task.159 
Such a recognition resolved in what one author has termed an “inversion of the relation 
between civil society and political society:”160 the state can only be upended once civil society is 
altered to encompass the changed worldview that would establish the basis for the new state. 
Gramsci innovated on Marxist doctrine by asserting that the civil society was not the initial 
moment, providing the chaotic state of nature with its warring contradictions that the state 
needed to dominate, but rather, civil society provided the organization and regulation that 
served as the basis for the state. Civil society embraced the whole commercial, industrial and 
intellectual life of a given stage which led it to transcend the state. 161 
If the state could be transformed, indeed, had to be transformed, through a 
transformation of civil society, this transformation relied on the ideological practice of 
intellectuals. For Gramsci, an intellectual was anyone “whose function in society was primarily 
that of organizing, administering, directing, educating or leading others.”162 This broad 
definition allowed for the intellectual class to include those who created the worldview of the 
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dominant class, as well as those who simply passed on a worldview, or translated received 
ideas to different audiences, in different contexts. 
Gramsci noted the importance of the material and institutional nature of ideological 
practice, how a distinct worldview was transmitted through schools, churches, the media, even 
architecture.163 This ensemble of institutions, when combined with the state, with its own 
multiplicity of political jurisdictions (state, federal, county, local and executive, legislative and 
judicial) “establishes a dynamic relation between state and society, sometimes competitive, 
sometimes collaborative, but each responding to the other, but neither able to dominate the 
other.”164 
The result of this dynamic process is that this worldview is articulated at various levels 
of the given social formation and, rather than creating confusion or division, serves to 
permeate all aspects of civil and political life. Thus, we arrive at Gramsci’s most trenchant 
contribution to the political theory of power, the idea of hegemony, in which one class is able 
to articulate its interests so that all classes feel their interests are represented by the dominant 
ideology: hegemony is the moment of junction between the determinate objective conditions 
and the actual domination of a leading group, with this junction coming about in civil society.165 
Gramsci defined two methods of gaining hegemony, with the first being when a social 
group articulates its own interests so as to neutralize other social groups, and the second being 
when a social group articulates its interests so as to promote the full development of all the 
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sectors of society.166 Gramsci, in his study of Italian political practice, realized the bourgeoisie 
had used the first method, by managing to create a group of allies to accord with the pursuit of 
its own interests.167 
This first method, in turn, depended on a double process: the self-awareness of the 
bourgeoisie as an autonomous group and the simultaneous creation of a basis of consensus.  
The bourgeoisie used this consensus to create an “historical bloc,” one which could be 
educated to adopt the requirements of the bourgeoisie in order to reach the goals the 
bourgeoisie desired.168  
What was unique about Gramsci’s articulation of hegemony and “historical bloc” was 
that he saw that the bourgeoisie gained a dominant position, “not by means of monopolization 
of the means of production [or] the means of violence or administration, but primarily through 
a more subtle process of winning the consent of all other subaltern classes to its ideology.” 
Gramsci saw that the “regulated society” applied not just to the manner in which ideas were 
generated, but also to their content. 
The manner in which Gramsci understood how hegemony was achieved is critical, 
because he ascertained that the logic which created the hegemonic position also applied to the 
creation of an alternative hegemony. An historical bloc based on a hegemonic ideology could 
be disrupted by an alternative ideology, one which disarticulated the dominant ideology and 
rearticulated an ideology that promoted the interests of the subaltern or the proletariat.169 
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Gramsci’s grasp of how hegemony was created was instrumental in allowing him to 
break away from the concept of ideology as “false consciousness” among the proletariat. 
Rather than suffering under a blind assumption of bourgeoisie interests,170 Gramsci understood 
how the bourgeoisie was able to universalize its direction of society to incorporate the 
proletariat. “This [was] not due to ‘bad faith’… [on the part of the proletariat] but to the 
uncritical ‘borrowing of conceptions’ which [bound a class] to another social group.”171 
Gramsci saw how the consciousness of subordinate groups was mediated by the 
dominant group, thus rendering Marxist theory ineffective.172 This consciousness revealed itself 
through the material nature of ideology, that is, that the ideology adopted by the proletariat 
worked to create the conditions which contributed to their further subordination.173  He also 
saw how this universalization of consciousness created a conformism that applied to everyone: 
“one is either mass-man or collective man.”174 
Nevertheless, he also saw that the reality of proletarian existence could break through 
this conformism. Consonant with his desire to bring reality to theory, he knew that the 
“common sense” of the bourgeoisie could be defeated by educating the proletariat about the 
“good sense” of their everyday existence.175 Such a process relied, paradoxically, on the manner 
in which the “common sense” of a hegemonic worldview became universalized. 
As noted earlier, civil society exists at various levels and these levels comprise a plurality 
of political spaces in which a hegemonic project operates. Although hegemony is a function of 
 
170 Mouffe, “Hegemony,” 199 
171 Merrington, “Theory and Practice,” 160 
172 Merrington, “Theory and Practice,” 160 
173 Mouffe, “Hegemony,” 183 
174 Mouffe, “Hegemony,” 186 
175 Mouffe, “Hegemony,” 186 
 41 
an “intellectual bloc,” this bloc is comprised of diverse groups, who apply different arguments 
in different historical, economic and cultural spaces. No one group is able to obtain supremacy 
over another, thus creating the open space in which politics operates.176 
It is within this multiplicity of spaces that an alternative hegemony is able to take root. 
The starting point for any alternative political project is in its assessment of the relations of 
forces the project must overcome to achieve its goal. This assessment looks at the material and 
social conditions the subaltern faces, as historically constructed. Such an assessment allows an 
individual to understand his role as an historical subject and, as Machiavelli pointed out, once 
this recognition has been achieved, an individual begins to understand his role as an historical 
agent, able to create an alternative to the current political situation. “It is only when the 
objective conditions have been recognised [sic] that the active subject becomes free and is able 
to transform reality.”177  
Such an assessment of the relations of forces, Gramsci noted, should distinguish 
between the “incurable contradictions” within society, that allow for a movement to challenge 
the entire hegemonic system, and the “incidental movements of conjecture” which are limited 
to adjustments within the power structure.178 But even with this distinction, it is important to 
acknowledge how Gramsci makes the link between ideological awareness, recognition of one’s 
role as an historically constituted subject, and the development of political agency. For once he 
had laid out how political power is constituted, and how it could be challenged, Gramsci could 
then spell out how ideological awareness could be created to bring forth this challenge. 
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Gramsci made it clear (quoting Marx) that “it is in the sphere of ideology that men 
become conscious of [political] conflict and fight it out.”179 For Gramsci, bourgeois domination 
was an ideological and cultural fact, and it was only through the creation of a new intellectual 
order, by undoing the universalization of bourgeois thought amongst the subaltern, could this 
fact be overcome.180 
For Gramsci, hegemony was a higher synthesis of ideology which encompassed the 
linkages of awareness, historicity, and political agency detailed above, established as an 
ideological unity. This higher synthesis formed the “collective will” that became the protagonist 
for political action, with the ideological unity serving as the “cement” of this will.181 Such a 
synthesis is analogous to Machiavelli’s new political order, in that the collective will depended 
on a new form of intellectual and political leadership, with the exercise of this leadership 
relying on the simultaneous development of the collective will - the subject/object dichotomy 
repeated.182 
Looking at leadership in this manner led Gramsci to redefine the role of the intellectual, 
in fact, to redefine it in such a way as to be similar to Machiavelli’s notion of a “new prince.” 
Gramsci was insistent there was no independent class of intellectuals, that an intellectual was 
anyone who organized, administered, directed, educated or led others.183 The problem, as he 
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saw it, was in creating intellectuals who could critique the current political system and not 
simply parrot existing hegemonic discourse.  
Related to this problem was one in which this new intellectual order, having the ability 
to critique the political order, did so in a manner understandable to the proletariat, while also 
rendering it acceptable to potential allies.184 Similar to the “new prince,” the new intellectual 
had to engage in a discourse with the proletariat, while at the same time developing and 
advancing this discourse, to both gain power and create the new political order that would 
embody the new critique. 
The creation of this new intellectual order was the first stage in the hegemonic project 
Gramsci articulated, with the following three stages being: “hegemony as a political project; the 
realization of this hegemonic project in the concrete institutions and organizational forms of a 
'hegemonic apparatus'; and fourth, ultimately and decisively, the social and political hegemony 
of the workers' movement.”185 And for hegemony to succeed as a political project, it was 
necessary to do more than create an alternative worldview; one needed to break down the 
principles of the common worldview of the dominant group. 
This common worldview does not exist in a simplistic fashion, but is instead comprised 
of a complex ensemble of elements “whose contents can never be determined in advance since 
it depends on a whole series of historical and national factors and also on the relations of forces 
existing at a particular moment.”186 This ensemble of elements Gramsci assembled under the 
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term of “common sense,” and it is “common sense,” that Adamson notes, which “represents 
the place from which any genuine [proletarian] education must depart.”187  
“Common sense,” as with other ideologies, has its roots in “true” elements of societal 
and cultural practice, but its relation to the truth is subordinate to its function “as the cultural 
cement smoothing relations between state and civil society.”188 Intrinsic to the definition of 
“common sense” is its contrast with “good sense,” that is, to thought that satisfies the real 
needs and interests of the masses of ordinary people who hold it.189 Nevertheless, because 
“common sense” is comprised of many elements, it is an ideology which maintains a stratified 
character, and is thus able to incorporate any philosophical challenges to it as new 
sedimentations within a shifting corpus, rather than be exposed and overcome by these 
challenges – “the complexity of common sense is matched only by its seeming intractability.”190 
This battle of “good sense” against “common sense” highlights the asymmetric power 
struggle between the subaltern and the dominant society. Fontana applies a geographical 
analogy to this struggle, with the “North” representing coherence and hegemonic supremacy 
over the “South,” which represents fragmentation and incoherence. Whereas the “common 
sense” of the North is easily accessible, the divisions within the worldview of the South allow 
for it to be easily dominated.191 Thus, it becomes incumbent for the subaltern to subjectively 
realize the objective conditions which serve as the basis of power of the “North.” The attack on 
“common sense” grows out of the recognition and articulation of those elements of the 
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dominant ideology that cannot stand the scrutiny of “good sense” and which serve as the basis 
for a unified ideology of the subaltern.192 
Again, one can see how the subject/object dichotomy, initially posited by Machiavelli, 
plays out in the subaltern establishing a new political order. This new political order depends on 
the subaltern forming a “collective will,” which relies on the development of “good sense” to 
combat “common sense,” which turns on a subjective recognition of the factors occluded by 
“common sense.” This recognition develops the subaltern’s understanding of his historical 
condition, which serves to create the political agency needed to create a “collective will.” Not a 
circular development, Gramsci’s formulation should be seen as one of overlapping elements, 
each reinforcing another, with a worked-out ideology, that is constantly being modified and 
adjusted, serving as its core. The new political order requires the former subaltern to grow 
ideologically, and then to respond to this new growth, not in a linear fashion, but in a dialectical 
one. 
Such a viewpoint reveals again why Gramsci was critical of Italian Marxist doctrine after 
the rise of fascism. The appeal of “direct action” to the masses, assumed the existence of 
revolutionary agency in society without any political organization. Alternatively, the divide 
between the Socialist party, the intellectuals and the masses, pointed out a failure of political 
leadership to establish the revolutionary hegemony needed to overtake the dominant bloc.193 
Both criticisms, from two different standpoints, reflected the same problem: “who, or what 
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entity, is the agent that, through its practice and active engagement in the world… resolves the 
contradiction between thought and action, ethics and politics, ‘culture’ and people.”194 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony involved the creation and development of an actor 
who, working within the existing sociopolitical order, possesses the ability to transcend that 
order, and does transcend it, by embodying the new order, and making it concrete in the 
world.195 And for Gramsci, the only way in which this new actor could develop was for Marxism 
to engage with what people actually thought, to bring practice to theory, to bring critical 
awareness to “common sense.”196 Gramsci insisted that elements of “good sense” were already 
present within people’s “common sense,” that this “good sense” could leverage the 
consciousness of people who were already aware of the truth of their existence.197 
The problem, as Gramsci saw it, was to develop the institutions that would allow the 
worker to develop this autonomous awareness of his existence, to develop his agency. He 
sought to address the question of how does one create a culture of critical awareness, not just 
within individuals, or within a cadre of intellectuals, but within the mass of people?198 Such a 
movement, he realized, could only be accomplished if the intellectual leadership of the 
subaltern served a directing function before the actual revolutionary moment. This group “must 
already become 'directing' before the conquest of power (this is itself one of the principal 
conditions of the conquest of power),” exercising de facto leadership in order to reach a 
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hegemonic position. This leadership would conduct itself in a dialectical fashion, leading the 
subaltern, but also being directed by it.199 
 Such a process Gramsci articulated, in a fundamentally new theory of revolution, as the 
“war of position.”200 This concept envisioned an extended campaign for ideological hegemonic 
influence,201 with (extending the military analogy) “a series of moral and intellectual battles 
whose goal is the construction of a given social and political reality.”202 In the revolutionary 
struggle, the “war of position” is the decisive moment.203 
But as one author has pointed, the “war of position,” while being decisive, can be 
divided into two stages, with the intellectual battle being only the first stage, a “passive 
revolution.”204 It would be still be necessary to take this “long prepared force… into the field 
when it is judged that a situation is favourable [sic].”205 The mass of people needed to be 
developed and rendered “homogenous, compact and self-aware,” and then placed into action 
when a subjective analysis of the relations of force deemed it propitious.206 
This move into collective organized action allowed the subaltern to identify and 
confront specific targets. Through such action, the various parts of his world become concrete 
and he would come to an understanding of his own position in relation to the rest of the world, 
that is, he would gain a specific class consciousness, based on ideological unity.207 
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Gramsci described this moment of understanding as a moment of catharsis “which 
alleviates primordially understood doubts, fears, and contradictions” of the subaltern.208 Such a 
moment is important in Gramsci’s revolutionary theory, because in it he definitively moves 
away from the Marxist notion of theory being actualized in the world through a deterministic 
process, and instead puts forward a theory that relies on conscious action, in which theory and 
practice are actualized in a determined historical context.209 
Thus, Gramsci’s theory can be seen as a reconceptualization of Marxism in that the 
realization by the subaltern of his historical economic condition is only a phase that needs to 
evolve and be elaborated on in a “philosophy of praxis” that actualizes this realization.210 His 
theory broadens the understanding of Marx by subordinating the relations of production to 
man; history “becomes a process of structuralization of human knowledge based on the 
organized will of man.”211 
His theory can also be seen as echoing Machiavelli’s insertion of the mass into history, 
that once man is placed between the problem and the solution, he will create a solution that 
transcends the facts from which the problem arose. This solution manifests itself as a moral and 
philosophical act that develops an “ought to be” rooted in a material and concrete “is.”212 And 
this solution can only be reached through a dialectical exchange between the leaders of a 
political movement and those who participate in it.213 
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Gramsci’s belief in a dialectical exchange was not simply a tactic to facilitate 
revolutionary change; rather, he felt it imperative that the intellectual and moral direction of a 
revolutionary movement should come from an active exchange of elements between the 
intellectual leadership and the members of the movement. This was the only way to create a 
unified ideological system that would break down hegemonic thought while also articulating 
the interests of the subaltern;214 this was the only way for a revolutionary movement to 
unearth the source of the problems it set out to discover.215 
Such a process would evolve dialectically, by breaking down the basic elements of the 
current system, and then rearticulating the changed elements into a new system that would 
express the new situation.216 Gramsci criticized Italian socialists by not adopting such a 
procedural model, by conceiving of politics “as something nourished on air, which develops in 
itself and by itself.”217 For Gramsci, any socialist party had to be based on an organic 
relationship with the class it represented, through “spontaneity and conscious direction.”218 
Consequently, for Gramsci, the political thought of the party, or any intellectual 
leadership, is the thought of the popular masses; it is a knowledge that acquires its character by 
addressing itself to the masses and, concurrently, the masses acquire their moral and 
intellectual understanding as they become the embodiment of this knowledge.219 Once again, 
we see Machiavelli’s influence on Gramsci, with the party becoming the “new prince” and the 
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masses becoming part of a new political ethos which they helped to create, with this ethos 
based on their needs. 
This new ethos would still need conscious direction in order to become actual; the 
subaltern has a generalized propensity toward spontaneous, reactive and unpredictable 
actions.220 There is still needed a wedding of knowledge to power that would analyze the 
subjective conditions for revolutionary action. Gramsci offered that socio-political 
circumstances do not themselves produce political change, they only set the conditions in 
which such change becomes possible. Some of those conditions were:  
“the relations of force obtaining at the political level, the degree of political organization 
and combativity of the opposing forces, the strength of the political alliances which they 
manage to bind together and their level of political consciousness, [and] preparation of the 
struggle on the ideological terrain.”221 
 
Fontana extends his geographical analogy of the relations of force, adding to the 
imbalances present in the North/South dyad, an East/West dichotomy, with the East 
representing political society as the state of coercion, and the West representing civil society as 
the state of consent, with each existing in a constant and reciprocal tension with one another, 
with both acquiring meaning only in relation to each other.222 Thus, the creation of any 
hegemonic project is not static but a continuous process of creation, unevenly developed and 
expressed.223 
Such an insight is important because it points out that even in a “complete revolution - 
one that brings to power a coherent class formation united behind a single economic, political, 
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and cultural conception of the world,”224 there is still an ongoing process of change, exchange 
and reformulation. What is most important in the revolutionary process envisioned by Gramsci 
is that the mass of people have become the hegemonic force that exercises leadership. What is 
key is that the masses have reached “the self-consciousness of being in an active and purposive 
engagement with society and with history, an engagement that is both the product of such 
consciousness and the ground that gives rise to it.”225 The mass of people have come to 
constitute the new political ethos. 
In summary, Gramsci’s thinking provides sufficient context in which to understand the 
political dimensions of the reform campaigns. His theory outlines the nature of power, how the 
state is a site of both coercion and consent, and how it consists of both the formal state and 
civil society. He provides an understanding of how the state is transformed through civil society, 
of how intellectuals develop a worldview through civil society that then forms a hegemonic bloc 
by which one class is able to dominate all others. 
Gramsci notes how this hegemony is formed by consent, how the subaltern adopts the 
dominant worldview, not through false consciousness, but through conformism with other 
sectors of society, through the adoption of “common sense.” He then points out how this 
hegemony can be challenged, by developing political agency in the subaltern, by restoring the 
dialectic between what society ought to be for the subaltern and what it is. This dialectic is 
rooted in the reality of the subaltern’s existence, and in recognizing this reality, the subaltern 
begins to understand the nature of power and of his historical situation. This realization forms 
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the political agency necessary to create the “what is” from the “what ought to be;” this 
realization helps the subaltern to develop a criticism of culture to engage with the world. 
Gramsci also spelled out the process by which this ideological awareness takes place. It 
is necessary for an intellectual leadership to promote a dialectical discourse with the subaltern, 
a discourse in which the leadership is learning as much as they are teaching about objective 
conditions. This discourse is able to break down the “common sense” of the dominant class and 
replace it with the “good sense” of those elements that improve the subaltern’s existence. This 
discourse eventually forms an alternative hegemony, an ideological bloc, that engages in a “war 
of position.” This “war of position” is the necessary step to facilitate the seizure of power; it is 
the conquering of the dominant hegemony of civil society, without which the ultimate ascent to 
power is not possible. 
The intellectual leadership directs this new hegemony toward specific targets to be 
overthrown, with this movement into a phase of action creating a “cathartic” moment for the 
subaltern, in which he realizes the extent of his power and claims a full sense of political 
agency. This moment of catharsis is then expanded upon, under conscious direction of the 
leadership, into a continuous process of creating a new society, but this direction is no longer 
driven by an intellectual elite, but is the people expressing themselves politically. 
Given this broad understanding of the way in power is constituted, alternatives to 
hegemony are created, and the role of ideology in both, it remains to be seen how the specifics 
of the reform campaigns fit within this understanding. 
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V. Optimism of the Intellect, Pessimism of the Will 
  
As I stated earlier, I regard both of the police reform campaigns as failures and thus, it 
becomes necessary to explain why they failed. Many reasons can be given for the campaigns 
lack of success, but the primary reason, in my opinion, is they lacked an accurate conception of 
themselves and of the mass of people for whom they claimed to be speaking, and of how both 
related to political power, with this misconception creating an inaccurate assessment of their 
opponents and of how power is constituted.  
There could potentially be any number of approaches to assessing why these failures 
mattered in not achieving the campaigns’ goals, but I have adopted a Gramscian analytic, 
rooted in Machiavellian political theory, to engage with the subject matter. Gramsci’s 
discussions of how power is constructed, how political agency is created, and the role of 
ideology in both, provides not only the proper context to understand the campaigns’ tactics and 
strategies, I feel, but allows one to understand why their failure to address each of these 
aspects of political theory resulted in failed campaigns. 
 Ultimately, Gramsci’s thought is an appropriate basis for analyzing these campaigns 
because his thinking is based in historicism, that is, in an assessment of human activity 
becoming conscious of itself, and of the manner in which the organized will of humans 
structures knowledge. This historicism is not necessarily a Marxist approach, but:  
“a critique of all ideologies, which relates ideas, beliefs, and values to 
their respective social frameworks; a theory… which seeks to alter or transform 
existing social structures by focusing on their limitations and revealing new 
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possibilities; [and] an ideological tool allowing men to actualize such new 
possibilities through the organization and politicization of subaltern classes.”226 
 
Gramsci’s historicism requires an objective understanding of the historical conditions 
creating your current circumstance and the belief that you can change them; neither campaign 
sought to develop either this understanding or such belief. Thus, both campaigns were 
handicapped from the start in developing the proper approach to reach their goals. 
Specifically, I am asserting five reasons why the campaigns were not successful, all 
stemming from their initial misconception. First, they never understood their task as obtaining 
power for the mass of citizens who lacked it in regard to the police. Second, this lack of 
understanding led to a failure to develop the mass of people who could develop this new 
relationship to the police, who could embody a different political ethos, and put it into practice 
in the concreate reality of bail reform and police discipline. Third, this failure was mainly due to 
the leaders of the campaigns not engaging in a dialectical relationship with the people for 
whom they claimed to be speaking, to incorporate the reality of people’s situation into the 
theory of the campaigns’ talking points and strategy. This lack of engagement led to the fourth 
reason, that the reform campaigns never created an adequate ideological basis for their 
arguments, were never able to make use of the mass of people’s “good sense” to combat the 
hegemony of “common sense.” Fifth, the campaigns inaccurately assessed the state as being 
the legislature, without accommodating the role of police departments, district attorneys in 
dominating civil society discourse and the discourse around their two campaigns. Finally, I 
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conclude that all of these failures, instead of advancing the cause of police reform, only served 
to hinder it. 
First, both campaigns viewed their goal as making the system of policing fairer – bail 
reform by not jailing arrested persons before trial, repeal of Section 50-a by informing victims 
of police misconduct of any officer discipline – but neither goal was understood as altering a 
fundamental relationship between citizens and the police. 
In fact, bail reform sought to alter the status of arrested persons as criminals from 
whom society needed to be protected, to citizens who maintained all of their rights and 
privileges until a final determination of their criminal case. Such an alteration interpolated a 
certain social contract between the role of the police as executors of the power of arrest and 
their role as determinate assessors of right and wrong behavior. The repeal of Section 50-a, on 
the other hand, sought to alter police discipline from something that solely concerned the 
police department to a matter that was of public concern. Taken to its logical conclusion, repeal 
of Section 50-a sought to enact the fundamental principle that the police are ultimately 
accountable to the people they are sworn to serve, with such an enactment upturning the 
current ethos and culture of policing. 
Viewing the reform campaigns goals in this, more honest and accurate, manner, makes 
it clear that the people for whom the campaigns claimed to speak were not simple reformers, 
but people who lacked power and who were seeking to gain greater power and control over 
their lives. Because the campaigns did not have this clear-eyed view of the goals of their 
campaigns, they never advanced to the proper political understanding of what was necessary to 
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reach their goals; they never sought “to alter or transform [the] existing social structures by 
focusing on their limitations and revealing new possibilities.” 
Because the campaigns never viewed their mission as obtaining power for the mass of 
people, this led to a second failure, as identified by Gramscian theory. Both campaigns did not 
participate in a process of creating citizens who could develop and utilize this power, who 
would embody this altered relationship with the police; the campaigns never engaged in the 
subject/object dichotomy that Machiavelli identified as being necessary to create a new 
political ethos. Such a process necessitated first making people aware of the conditions of their 
historical situation, that is, of how the system of bail curtailed their rights as citizens and how 
the system of discipline transparency impeded any police accountability to citizens. The second 
step would have been to develop the “what ought to be” out of the current “what is,” to utilize 
the knowledge of the current historical situation to create an alternative that would satisfy 
people’s needs and that would meet this new understanding of their relation to the police. 
Finally, this awareness of “what ought to be” would work to create the citizens who could 
embody this new relationship, who are empowered by the movement from the ideal “what 
ought to be” to the change in the concrete reality of their daily relationship with the police. 
For instance, the bail reform campaign should have required that the program, created 
to ensure that persons released before trial would appear for their scheduled appearance, was 
in place by the effective date of the bail reform legislation, January 1, 2020.227  Such a 
requirement could have helped the persons released under bail reform who needed assistance. 
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More importantly, however, the data on persons released under bail reform could have been 
used to convince, not the opponents of bail reform, but the persons released under bail reform, 
of their worth as citizens. The data could have been used as real-time indicia of the merits of 
the bail reform arguments: numbers of appearances kept, jobs not lost, families kept intact, all 
could have been used to create a sense of community of persons released, citizens disproving 
bail reform’s opponents, rather than remaining a collection of disaggregated individuals. 
Such a strategic development, however, would have supposed a dialectical relationship 
between the organizations comprising the campaigns and the people for whom they claimed to 
be speaking, a relationship that did not exist, thus providing a third reason for failure. The 
leaders of the reform campaigns acted as an intellectual elite, deciding on the tactics, goals and 
strategies for the campaigns. Gramsci envisioned an intellectual elite, and Machiavelli a “new 
prince,” as one which would develop a discourse with the people that would form the new 
political ethos, make sure this ethos reflected the reality of the mass of the people, while 
developing the political capabilities of the people who would embody this new ethos. This elite, 
in turn, would be transformed by this dialectical relationship, so that it would be the people’s 
representatives, in as much as it reflected the ethos of the mass of people created by this 
dialectical relationship. 
For example, after the passage of the initial bail reform legislation, the reform campaign 
had nine months to develop a relationship with the persons who would benefit from the 
reform, as well as with citizens in general. Such a dialectical relationship not only could have 
created a mass of people who understood and embraced reform, but also could have informed 
the leaders of the campaigns of the real issues involved in reform. Instead, after allowing the 
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opponents of bail reform to gain the initiative after bail reform was passed, it engaged in a $2 
million media campaign to counteract the disinformation of their opponents, a campaign that 
turned out to be wholly unsuccessful.   
In addition, a discussion with victims of police misconduct would have revealed that, 
because the NYPD has complete control over its disciplinary system, it is able to characterize 
egregious crimes as “minor rules violations,” which, under the repeal legislation, does not have 
to be disclosed. As an example, published reports noted that a detective, who was accused of 
sexually assaulting a confidential informant and extorting sexual favors from her, was punished 
only with the loss of 40 vacation days, raising the question of why such a small penalty was 
appropriate for such heinous accusations? The answer was because the detective was charged 
only with the “minor rules violations” of “violating confidential informant procedures [and] 
failing to document investigative actions.”228 Thus, neither the alleged victim nor the public is 
permitted to be informed of the detective’s penalty under the repeal Section 50-a bill passed by 
the legislature (although the outcome was eventually leaked to the press). The reform 
campaign could have avoided such an outcome if it had truly understood and been engaged 
with the reality of persons who have suffered from police misconduct. 
Instead, both campaigns made use of individual instances of terrible miscarriages of 
justice to make their points, rather than engaging with individuals as people who mattered. For 
example, the repeal Section 50-a campaign relied on the secrecy surrounding the Eric Garner 
discipline case to make its case. Meanwhile, the bail reform campaign relied on the example of 
Kalief Browder, who, because he could not afford $3,000 bail, spent three years in jail (with a 
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year and a half of that time spent in solitary confinement), with the criminal charges eventually 
being dismissed without a trial.229 Both examples were deployed as props, to make a point, 
instead as two of the many individuals with whom the campaign needed to engage. 
Both campaigns failed to leverage the consciousness of the mass of people to develop 
their “good sense” in contrast to the “common sense” that bail reform and section 50-a repeal 
would lead to more crime and less respect for the police. This reflected the campaigns’ fourth 
failure, according to Gramsci, a failure to develop an ideological basis for their campaigns. For 
instance, the bail reform campaign failed to develop the “good sense” of people’s awareness 
that almost all persons arrested for a crime do not commit another crime after being released 
without bail,230 to contrast with the “common sense” fear of crime. 
The campaign did not appreciate the intractability of “common sense” and never 
accounted for the manner in which popular beliefs concerning crime have material force, and 
how these beliefs could turn against them. The campaign refused to acknowledge Gramsci’s 
point of how ideology is formed and adopted through a universalization of consciousness, even 
though poll results showed that as the arguments around bail reform persisted, the idea 
became less and less attractive in the public’s mind.231 
The campaigns needed to create a higher synthesis of ideology, based on the 
recognition of “good sense” to combat the hegemony of “common sense.” Thus, for example, 
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the bail reform campaign should have translated the reality of people’s experiences with the 
bail system into a broader understanding of people’s role within the criminal justice system and 
how it impinges on their lives. Similarly, the repeal Section 50-a campaign should have 
expanded on the realization that police are accountable to the citizenry to a broader awareness 
of the role the police and policing play in shaping our lives. It is this ideological basis that 
provides the “cathartic” moment, in which success in the specific campaign for bail reform or 
discipline transparency, combined with an ideological understanding of the historical situation, 
creates the “collective will” by which the subaltern, those without power, begins to understand 
its true capabilities for revolutionary change. 
It is this ideological understanding that begins the process of a “war of position,” by 
which an ideological “historical bloc” is formed. The reform campaigns mistakenly took the 
“Blue Wave” election of 2018 and the George Floyd protests as proof of an ideological sea 
change needed to secure their reforms, without noticing that both moments were ideologically 
contentless. Both reform campaigns never bothered to developethe core of supporters who 
embodied a specific political ethos, that could have used this ethos to apply virtu to control 
fortuna, to shape events following the 2018 election and the Floyd protests, respectively. 
All of these shortcomings, perhaps, pale in regard to the campaigns’ final failure, that of 
not accommodating the manner in which state and civil society are intertwined. The campaigns 
viewed the state as extending only so far as the legislature. They sought to influence the 
legislature only, failing to recognize the manner in which police departments, police unions and 
district attorneys wield power, and how all of these actors were able to dominate the discourse 
in civil society of both campaigns and how this discourse might affect the legislature. “We might 
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be seeing the limitations of a legislative approach, especially when it’s coming up against this 
coordination between police, police unions, prosecutors, and conservative politics,”232 noted 
one member of the reform campaign, in something of a post-mortem to the campaign after the 
“reform to the bail reform” had passed the legislature. 
The repeal of Section 50-a campaign, for example, did not account for the way in which 
the dominant discourse of civil society is able to incorporate new philosophical challenges “as 
new sedimentations within a shifting corpus.” The characterization of disciplinary transparency 
as an issue of public trust allowed the NYPD to create the perception it was responding to the 
need for transparency, while keeping discipline completely in the dark.  
Similarly, the bail reform campaign didn’t address the manner in which force and 
consent are intertwined in the creation of hegemonic discourse. The campaign opponents, in 
the form of police departments and district attorneys, argued that only they truly knew how 
the criminal justice system worked.233 Thus, the opponents of bail reform could lay claim to a 
superior knowledge as to the debate’s subject matter because of their existent authority to 
decide such matters in reality, not as a debating point. That is to say, they had the force of the 
state behind their discourse. The bail reform campaign again was unwilling to engage with the 
degree of force inherent in their opponents’ arguments, focusing all of their energy on the 
legislative strategy. 
 Some would argue that, despite the failures that I have enumerated, the cause of police 
reform, nevertheless, has advanced; I would disagree, for three reasons. First, three times in 
 
232 Pinto, “The Unraveling” 
233 Rayman, “Our Job” 
 62 
the last eight years, the CPR coalition, for example, has conducted reform campaigns that they 
claim have advanced the cause police accountability. And yet, after each campaign, as with the 
repeal Section 50-a campaign, the coalition has asserted the NYPD has thwarted its attempts to 
make the department more accountable. 
 Just last month, for instance, it was revealed how the NYPD’s Inspector General, an 
office created as a result of a CPR campaign, had been rendered ineffective because of lack of 
cooperation from the NYPD.234 Such an outcome is to be expected, I would say, because this 
particular “reform” did nothing to alter the power dynamic between the police and everyone 
else. Yes, it’s true, that police have the authority to enforce the law and to control order, but it 
is only the authority that we give to them, and we always maintain the power to establish the 
parameters of that authority. None of the reforms posited by CPR addressed this underlying 
issue, and until this issue is confronted, we will continue to engage in shadow-plays with the 
NYPD, in which they pretend to sublimate themselves to our authority in the foreground, with 
the truth of the situation being expressed in the background. 
 Second, no real change has come about in the objective conditions in which any police 
reform could possibly occur. Last August, after the George Floyd protests, a Gallup poll showed, 
for the first time, that less than half of all Americans had confidence in the police, with white 
Americans polling at 56% and black Americans at 19%.235 This past March, however, the 
confidence level of whites in the police had risen by 12 percentage points; amongst blacks it 
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had arisen by 14 points.236 More pertinently, perhaps, a national sample of white Americans 
showed that, rather than acknowledge or deal with racism in a systemic or social manner, most 
preferred to deal with racism in limited and private ways, such as listening to people of color.237 
All of which is to say that I don’t feel as if the events of the last year revealed the “incurable 
contradictions” within society, but rather that they represented the “incidental movements of 
conjecture” which are limited to reforms that don’t disturb the power structure. 
 Finally, there is no reason to think the organizations involved in the reform campaigns 
have learned any lessons or reassessed its tactics: CPR has conducted three campaigns, NYUJ 
two (counting bail reform and the “reform to the reform” as two) and they have conducted 
each one in the same manner: establishing talking points, media strategies, lobbying legislators, 
using individuals as props for their pre-determined strategies, that fail to take into account the 
facts on the ground, the dynamic relation between the problem, the solution, the actor and the 
subject. 
 In my opinion, such obtuseness is due to the raison d’etre of the non-governmental 
organizations that dominate New York’s police reform efforts. CPR was formed with the 
intention of: “substantially decreasing bias-based encounters with the police; increasing the 
ability of the most affected communities to hold the police accountable and prevent abusive 
policing; and building the political will among the public and policymakers to advance a more 
just and humane policing paradigm in New York City.”238 NYUJ was started with the intent “to 
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advance reforms to fix New York City’s broken criminal justice system that unfairly targets 
lower income communities and communities of color.”239 
 All of these goals sound admirable, if open-ended. They establish the basis for the 
campaigns’ operations: rallies, press releases, media campaigns, lobbying, legislation are all 
activities that can be quantified, measured, documented, accounted for, when seeking funds. 
None of the goals depend on proof they are transforming actual people’s lives, the ones’ 
undergoing the “unfair targeting” and the “inhumane policing.” These reform campaigns 
generate results that can be held up as achievements, but that don’t make a difference in the 
reality in which police officers interact with citizens. 
What is needed is a long-range process that builds on concrete successes that change 
the manner in which the police operate, rooted in the principle that they are accountable to us, 
the people whom they are sworn to serve. For instance, the repeal Section 50-a campaign 
never should have been allowed to go forward without first gaining a detailed understanding of 
how the NYPD’s system of discipline functioned. The ultimate goal of the campaign should not 
have been to make police discipline transparent: that should have been the short-range goal, 
with the long-range being to make officers accountable to the people, to alter the power 
dynamic between the people and the NYPD. 
This short-range goal could only be understood in the context of the final goal, thus, 
avoiding the circumstance in which the NYPD was allowed to assert what transparency looked 
like. The achievement of transparency would then lead to the next step: once the complete 
scope of discipline became clear to the public, we could begin to shape the discipline system in 
 
239 New Yorkers United for Justice https://nyuj.org/ (accessed 7 May 2021) 
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a manner that reflected the needs of the people, as opposed to the administrative and 
bureaucratic whims of the NYPD. Consequently, we would no longer have the situation in which 
an officer who failed to coordinate his precinct’s response to an officer shooting240 is disciplined 
with the same amount of punishment as an officer who sexually assaulted an underage 
prostitute.241 
Thus, we could begin the process by which the citizenry begins to assert its authority 
over the NYPD; we would reach that “cathartic” moment in which ideology is implanted in a 
concrete reality, thus creating the “collective will” by which the people begin to understand 
their ability to control history, instead of always being subject to it. Unfortunately, we are stuck 
with a process that privileges pre-determined tactics, strategies and goals and that doesn’t 
recognize the role people can play, must play, in transforming their lives. It is a process that 
reverses Gramsci’s dictum of “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will,” to “optimism of 
the intellect, pessimism of the will.” 
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